Tesi Macchiarulo - Pathos

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The hypothesis that organoids may occupy a minimal level of sentience suggests, from a consequentialist perspective, an obligation to minimize their suffering. This introduces the need to balance the potential harm inflicted on entities endowed with rudimentary sensitivity against the benefits of biomedical research. However, the use of organoids as mere experimental means raises deontological objections, exacerbated by their total inability to communicate or manifest internal states.

An analogy has been drawn with animal experimentation: as in that case, the issue is whether the benefits justify pain and suffering. Unlike animals, however, organoids lack output channels that would allow the inference of subjective states, making the interpretation of neural correlates of pain problematic.

The 2021 report by the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine emphasizes that pain cannot be reduced to mere nociceptive activation and that its circuitry is still incompletely understood. It follows that it is currently impossible to determine which neural configurations are sufficient to generate a painful experience. Two distinct problems therefore remain open: whether organoids actually experience pain and whether they possess the capacities required to perceive it.

The development of multiregional assembloids has increased the functional complexity of these models. In particular, these systems integrate different organoid components representing four brain regions – somatosensory, spinal, thalamic, and cortical – in order to reconstruct the circuitry involved in pain transmission.  Recent studies show coordinated, spontaneous, and synchronous activity in response to nociceptive stimuli, as well as the usefulness of these models for analyzing genetic variants associated with insensitivity or hyperalgesia. Despite this, such assembloids appear to be limited to signal transmission without generating subjective experiences, which would require further levels of brain integration.  However, the prospect of further increasing their complexity renders this distinction potentially unstable and strengthens the urgency of anticipatory ethical criteria.

Human-animal chimeras, obtained through the transplantation of human stem cells into animal brains, raise even more pressing ethical questions. In these organisms, the possibility of forms of consciousness appears less remote, making it urgent to define criteria for determining their moral status and the protections they should be afforded. The issue concerns not only physical suffering but also the possible emergence of complex mental states in biologically non-human organisms, with the risk of anomalous existential conditions. In this context of “moral confusion,” existing regulatory frameworks – such as those concerning animal welfare – prove partially inadequate.

The literature reveals a wide heterogeneity of positions, while converging on the need to ensure adequate levels of care and protection, especially for organisms with advanced cognitive capacities.  At the same time, international guidelines are continuously updated, reflecting the rapid pace of scientific progress.

Taken together, organoids, assembloids, and chimeras challenge established ethical categories, requiring a reconsideration of the criteria for attributing moral status under conditions of profound scientific uncertainty. This gives rise to the need for a regulatory framework that is both flexible and rigorous, capable of accompanying technological development without being reduced to a merely ex post reaction.